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Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R004300060015-5

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EX-2

21-1714-1

13 January 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel White

Only the DD/S&T proposed any substantive change in the papers which you sent to the Deputies et al. We have worked out a middle ground on his proposed substantive change which is incorporated in the attached and which affected only paragraph 4a of the "Guidance" paper. We have not acted on the other proposal which Carl Duckett recommended very strongly, namely, a separate memorandum to those addressees of the Presidential paper who have representatives on USIB. This Carl Duckett had suggested in the original discussion of the subject matter and we decided against it because only two of the addressees "qualified" and we believe that the Director should preferably not be in a position of attempting to tell the Secretaries of State and Defense how to implement recommendations within their Departments. In talking with Don Steininger who was representing the DD/S&T viewpoint it was agreed that only Defense is actually involved since Sec State has but one intelligence officer. Although NIPE and we do not recommend a separate letter to SecDef which specifies the Director/DIA as the advisor, the Director could if he agrees with Carl's point use a transmittal note in lieu of a separate letter. *or note*

We also attach the suggested internal paper prepared in the form of a Headquarters Notice. This represents a version agreed to by Messrs. Stewart, Parrott, Osborn and me. We have not referred the text to any of the other Deputies.

I hope these papers do not read too much like the product of a committee.

[Redacted]  
John W. Coffey

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Atts

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DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND COORDINATION  
AND CLEARANCE OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

1. The President is deeply concerned over the disclosure in the public media of classified information bearing upon important aspects of national security, particularly that which tends to jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. He has directed that immediate steps be taken to ensure that only individuals with a demonstrated "need-to-know" have access to classified information and are aware of the necessity to protect it from public disclosure. In addition, the President has ordered responsible officials to take firm disciplinary action against individuals under their jurisdiction found responsible for careless or deliberate mishandling of classified information.

*DCI*

2. I have the statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods which include clandestine agent personnel and technical collection systems. Unauthorized disclosures in any of these areas could result in the compromise of agent personnel or effective countermeasures by the opposition.

*DCI*

3. I believe that our current internal policies and procedures governing the dissemination and control of classified intelligence information are fundamentally sound. It is necessary, however, that all employees become fully aware of these policies and procedures and adhere to them. Among those of particular importance are:

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a. Inquiries from representatives of public information media will be referred to the Assistant to the Director. Employees of the Agency will have no contact with representatives of public information media for the purpose of furnishing information.

b. Employees should avoid contacts with public information media representatives which might result in the misuse or misconstrual of statements on matters of interest to the Agency.

c. The Assistant to the Director is responsible for coordination of press inquiries on substantive matters within the Agency. He will ensure that public statements or press releases of known or potential Presidential interest or having policy implications are cleared by the White House. When a paper is sent to the White House for clearance, it should reflect that it has received all necessary intelligence coordination.

d. Official external communications with policy implications having known or potential Presidential interest must be submitted to the Executive Director-Comptroller for clearance before release.

e. To prevent unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence information, I have designated the Executive Director-Comptroller or the Deputy Director concerned to monitor requests for unofficial public appearances or publications. For details refer to [redacted]

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f. Official data (see [redacted]) is not to be copied or removed from the files of the Agency for release outside the Agency except by those officials who have been so authorized through the chain of command by the Director of Central Intelligence. Official data is defined as all information, classified or unclassified, received, compiled or created by the Central Intelligence Agency (except personal copies of unclassified personnel papers).

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g. Internal disclosures of official data are limited to those employees whose duties require access to it (need-to-know).

h. Each individual employee of CIA is responsible for protecting official data from unauthorized disclosure.

i. All public requests for information under PL 89-487, "Freedom of Information Act," are to be handled and approved or disapproved by the Assistant to the Director (see [redacted])

j. The facts surrounding inadvertent disclosure of classified intelligence to any person or persons not authorized for access to such intelligence must be reported, as quickly as possible, to the Director of Security.

k. Any persons having knowledge of any unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence must report it promptly to the Director of Security, who in coordination with the appropriate Deputy Director or the Executive Director-Comptroller, will determine the steps to be taken to (1) limit the extent of the damage and (2) identify the person responsible for the unauthorized disclosure. He will also provide prompt notification, if necessary, to all official recipients that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred, together with advice of remedial action to be taken. In coordination with the appropriate Deputy Director or with the Executive Director-Comptroller, he will take disciplinary action where appropriate, in a just, clear and definite manner which will demonstrate the extreme seriousness with which unauthorized disclosures are viewed.

4. The cooperation of all employees is requested to ensure that our national security is protected against damage resulting from unauthorized disclosure. The unauthorized disclosure of classified information may seriously jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. I view my statutory responsibilities for the protection of

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intelligence sources and methods seriously and am prepared to take strong disciplinary measures on any violation of this and existing directives which are designed to protect these sources and methods.

Richard Helms  
Director of Central Intelligence

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